NAXALITE/MAOIST VIOLENCE, POLICE RESPONSE AND THE ROLE OF THE UNION HOME MINISTRY: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- KS Subramanian*

Naxalite/Maoist violence, atrocities and crimes against the SC/STs, development process and the special constitutional responsibility of government with regard to SC/STs are deeply interconnected issues. Discussion of Naxalite/Maoist violence must essentially be viewed from a social justice perspective not a national security perspective.

At the CMs conference organized by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) in 2006, the PM said the Naxalite violence was the ‘biggest national security threat’ faced by India. However, the Experts Group Report (2008) submitted to Planning Commission titled ‘Development Challenges in Extremist Affected Areas’ (see References) took a social justice view and called for a more sensitive and responsive development process. It is not clear what the MHA response has been to that report.

There seems to be an information gap in MHA on the nature and causes of the Naxalite/ Maoist violence. India’s position in the HDI, prepared by the UNDP has slipped to 132. About 80 percent of the population are said to be subsisting on Rs. 20 rupees. SC/STs constitute about a quarter of the Indian population and bulk large in the poverty population. They are a significant support base of the Naxalites/Maoists. The Planning Commission report says that weaker sections do not have much faith in the police and do not believe that justice will be done to them against the powerful. The Naxalites do provide protection to the weak against the powerful and take the security of and justice for the weak and the socially marginal seriously.

Yet the Ministry of Social Justice and Development, National Commissions for the SC/STs and the state government agencies dealing with SC/STs were not present in the 2006 CMs’ conference. How does one explain this conundrum? A crisis of development faces India. Government of India may begin by paying attention to the 28th Report (1986) of the Commissioner for the SCs and STs, Dr. B. D. Sharma’s report to the President, which delineated the ‘backlash of development’ on dalits and adivasis. The Report was described as a document ‘next in importance only to the Constitution of India’. Government of India may also pay attention to a recent study of the development strategy by Amit Bhaduri and Medha Patkar (EPW, January 3 2009).

INTRODUCTION

The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) is the nodal ministry on ‘law and order’ at the Government of India. The ministry was once in charge of the development and protection of the scheduled castes and tribes (SCs and STs), a special Constitutional responsibility entrusted to the Government of India. This implied a strong social justice component to its activities. The subject has now been transferred to the Ministry of Social Justice and Welfare (MSJ&W).

With its social justice component in law and order work, the MHA looked seriously at the problem of ‘atrocities’ against the SC’s and the ST’s by the upper castes and classes often with the support and connivance of the police while examining the ‘Naxalite’ violence which attracts considerable dalit/adivasis support. The Civil Rights Cell in the ministry monitored and reported on the increasing ‘atrocities’ against the dalits and adivasis. The Parliament took interest in the policies and programs for the development and protection of the SC’s and ST’s. The ministry had to reply to Parliament questions (often trying to provide as little information as possible to that august body!) In view of its police power, clout and resources, the MHA was in a position to persuade state governments to take pro-active social justice, development and protective measures for these historically exploited communities. The transfer of the subject to the newly-created Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment (MSJE), which lacks the prestige and resources of the MHA has been unfortunate as it lacks the ability to take care of the special constitutional responsibility for the dalits and adivasis. The absence of the MSJE from the CMs conference on Naxalite/Maoist violence was strange. Representatives of the two National Commissions on the SC’s and the ST’s as well as the ministers and officials of state governments dealing with the development and protection of SC/ST’s were also absent.

This context must be borne in mind while considering the deliberations at the conference of state chief ministers held in 2006 to debate the growing Naxalite/Maoist violence. The conference took a largely law and order view of the problem. Branding the problem a major ‘national security challenge’, it ignored the social justice component in the development and protection of the dalits and adivasis. The SC/ST’s together constitute about a quarter of the Indian population; they are largely poor, uneducated and uncared for and are often made victims of development. They constitute a significant support base for the Naxalite/Maoist movement.

As the nodal ministry on law and order, MHA has the responsibility of preparing national policy framework on conflict management and issue guidelines to state governments. The huge numbers of Central Paramilitary Forces (CPFs) recruited by the MHA for specific purposes, are frequently used for local conflict management in the states in clear departure from the intentions of the founding fathers of the Constitution. A former Home Secretary, however, referring to this conundrum, described India as a ‘dual polity’ (Srinivasavaradan, 1992).

The MHA, despite its manifold responsibilities, is devoid of a meaningful information base on conflict situations across the country. Its information base consists mainly of police reports from the IB and the state governments. To rectify the information deficiency in the ministry, a former Home Secretary set up the Research and Policy (R&P) Division (1967). The Division submitted a seminal report on the “Causes and Nature of Agrarian Tensions”. Similar reports followed on several patterns of violence in the country. However, it became a victim of an internal power struggle and was eventually wound up. The information gap in the ministry persists with disastrous consequences. Civil servants being ‘philosophers of the short term’ have relied on the deployment of the Central Paramilitary Forces (CPF’s).

The paper is in five parts: i) the current strategy and tactics of the MHA in dealing with the Naxalite/Maoist movement; ii) the information crisis in the MHA; iii) the Naxalite/Maoist movement today; iv) alternative policy framework for tackling the Naxalite movement; and v) structural reforms of the Union Home Ministry, the IB and the state and central police forces to meet the rising aspirations of the people keeping in view the Preamble, Directive Principles of State Policy and Fundamental Rights of the Constitution of India.

I. CURRENT STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF THE MHA

The Prime Minister in his March 14, 2006 address to the standing committee of chief ministers of states affected by Naxalite/Maoist violence had said that this violence was the biggest national security threat. The Union Home Minister in his statement in the Lok Sabha on March 1, 2006 revealed that 26 CPF battalions would be given to the states to deal with Naxalite/Maoist violence. On March 13, 2006, the minister asked the states not to enter into dialogue with the CPI (Maoists) unless they gave up arms. He told the meeting of the standing committee of chief ministers that ‘local resistance’ such as ‘Salwa Judum’ in Chhattisgarh will be ‘up-scaled’ (Navlakha, 2006). The situation in the Dantewara district (population: 0.8 million) of the largely tribal state of Chhattisgarh had assumed special importance in view of the violence of the ‘Salwa Judum’ activists backed by the central paramilitary forces and the violence of the Maoists well entrenched in the district (Balagopal, 2006; Navlakha, 2006; PUCL, 2006). A group of distinguished citizens after a visit to the district in 2006 reported that the victims of violence from both sides were the innocent tribal people who were not in any way part of the conflict. A closely argued analysis of the violence by both sides brought out the need for a ‘political handling of the issue and not suppression by brute force’ as is being attempted by the central and state governments (Balagopal, 2006). The National Common Minimum Program (NCMP) of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government (2004), which said that “the UPA government is concerned about the growth of extremist violence and other forms of terrorist activity in different states. This is not merely a law and order problem but a deeper socio-economic issue which will be addressed more meaningfully than has been the case so far. Fake encounters will not be permitted”.

At the DGP’s/IGP’s conference, 2005 held in New Delhi, the Coordination Centre of police officers circulated a document titled “Leftwing Extremism-Emerging Dimensions” stating the threat perception on the part of the IB and the police leadership of the concerned states. There was a huge gap in the information provided in the police report and the one that emanated from the citizens group regarding the nature and causes of the violence in Chhattisgarh. However, relying on police reports and disregarding the commitments made in NCMP, the MHA geared up as never before, to deploy the Central Paramilitary Forces on a massive scale in order to crush the Naxalite/Maoist mobilization going on in several states.

The annual report of the MHA for 2005-06 did refer to the statement made in the NCMP though it noted with deep concern the rapid spread of the Naxalite violence in several states. The report mentioned the Naxalite/Maoist issue as the third major ‘national security issue’ after the situation in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) and in the north-eastern region. The following table reports some facts relating to the violence during 2002-5.

HEAD                                2002             2003             2004             2005

No. of Incidents             1,465                1,597             1,533          1,594

No. of civilians Killed       382                      410             466             516

No. of Policemen killed    100                   105                100                153

No. of Naxalites Killed    141                   216                   87                   223

Source: (GOI, 2006, p. 23)

The MHA report added that in 2005, while the number of incidents had gone up by 4 percent over those of 2004, the ‘civilian’ casualties have gone up by 11 percent and of police personnel killed by 53 percent. It stated that 76 districts in the nine States of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal are badly affected. The level of violence was significant in Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, Maharashtra and Orissa.

In 2005, violence was reported from 509 police stations in 11 states out of a total of 12476 in the country including the above states. The State- wise breakup incidents and deaths for the years 2002 and 2005 were given. The annual report stated that the trends in violence included militarization and consolidation, attacks on police personnel, attacks on government/private property, holding of people’s courts and forging of linkages with the Maoists of Nepal. The MHA adopted a multi-pronged strategy to contain the violence including building up of ‘local capabilities’ to improve intelligence gathering; strengthening of the administrative machinery to redress grievances; improving delivery of accelerated socio-economic development; promoting employment opportunities; encouraging ‘local resistance’; and encouraging affected State governments to promote peace initiatives.

Further, three schemes were administered to strengthen the security apparatus at the State level: reimbursement of Security-Related Expenditure (SRE) with release of substantial funds in advance (Rs 2000 Crores in 2005-06), police modernization and up-gradation in terms of modern weaponry, mobility, and communication infrastructure; and finally, funds to raise India Reserve (IR) battalions to augment State police forces. Inter-State Intelligence Support Teams (ISISTS) were being set up in the States to strengthen intelligence collection and sharing in addition to sharing of intelligence by Central agencies with State agencies; special efforts to step up training of police forces; and increased vigil along the Indo-Nepal border.

On the development front, the MHA has advised State governments to ensure integrated development of the affected districts. Under the Backward Districts Initiative (BDI), Rs. 2475 Crores have been sanctioned by the Central government for 55 Naxal-affected districts. The ministry of environment and forests has issued general approval for the use of up to 1 hectare of forest land for security and socio-economic infrastructure in forest areas. Stepping up of implementation of Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act 1996, strengthening of administrative machinery by the posting of competent and willing officers to Naxalite areas, encouraging ‘local resistance groups’, ‘public perception management’, organization of tribal youths’ cultural exchange programs are the other development initiatives.

Finally, review mechanisms at the central level included a Task Force on Naxalism/Maoism under a Special Secretary of the MHA with a nodal officers from affected states and others; a Coordination Centre headed by the Union Home Secretary and consisting of State Chief Secretaries and Directors General of Police and others; and a standing committee of Chief Ministers and others under the chairmanship of the Union Home Minister.

The MHA’s approach made a reference to socio-economic issues but did not address the land question, the rural development strategy, the increasing violence against the SCs and STs or the massive displacement of these communities as a result of development projects and so on. It mentioned ‘project implementation in the rural areas’. As in the past, such efforts continue to be sabotaged by a corrupt administrative structure at the cutting edge level, in collusion with the rural power structure. Thus, the envisaged measures did not, in practice, constitute a sharp break from the traditional law and order approach. The existing administrative structure obstructs effective rural development because of its caste-class linkages with the existing rural power structure and it needs to be addressed. Further, the inherited administrative structure is basically regulatory given the colonial regime’s preoccupation with law and order. The post-independence development administrative machinery is a superimposition on the inherited regulatory structure led by the District Magistrate (DM).

Furthermore, the increasing numbers of the state armed police and central paramilitary forces for public order management is in strong contrast to the rather tenuous framework for development administration and social justice.

II INFORMATION CRISIS IN THE MHA

One of the ironies of the functioning of the MHA is that it was aware of the deficiencies in its information system and conflict analysis. It set up the Research and Policy(R&P) Division in 1967. However, it took no steps to set up institutional mechanisms to utilize the findings of the Division for policy making. It continued to rely on the British precedent of using force to tackle violence. A distinguished former Home Secretary (Srinivasavaradan, 1992) said that the available expertise at the bureaucratic level to understand, anticipate and evaluate an intricate problem was inadequate and amateurish. The situation in some cases was salvaged in the past because of the flexibility of the system, the sagacity of the political leadership and its openness to information from all quarters. Responsiveness to public opinion of all shades is important. Awareness and sensitivity contributes to responsiveness but it can never be provided by official briefings alone. The variety and persistence of the problems the polity faces calls for the creation of inter-disciplinary study-cum-action groups to monitor and analyze socio-economic trends. This was never done. Srinivasavaradan further noted that the Naxalite movement, which started in tribal areas, took roots in tracts where exploitation of the weaker sections was chronic, blatant and unmitigated. The political response of the MHA initially was sound as it was based on the perception that the objective socio-economic conditions, which were breeding and sustaining the violence must be dealt with. However, when the intensity of the violence abated and it became endemic and sporadic, the political response took the shape of the standard administrative action of deploying the central paramilitary forces in the affected areas. Allegations of fake encounters, illegal arrests and other misdeeds tended to be swept under the carpet. Srinivasavaradan concluded that ‘in dealing with problems of societal transition, excessive preoccupation with peace and order, ignoring issues of law and justice, can prove expensive in the long run’. Lack of steadfastness of purpose is not desirable in dealing with basic nation building tasks though reasonable success was seen in firefighting operations during war, drought and scarcity.

When issues with long term implications came up, the traditional responses and mechanisms of the MHA were found deficient. The prevailing ad-hocism and amateurishness could only be remedied by additional inputs of knowledge, skill and vision through multidisciplinary research and policy analysis. The setting up of the Research and Policy (R&P) Division of the MHA largely coincided with the emergence of the Naxalite movement in the late 1960s. But the studies done R & P Division were hardly ever utilized in policy making for want of appropriate mechanisms. The administrative obstacles to the implementation of agrarian reforms such as the lack of qualifications and integrity necessary for the administration of tenancy reforms on the part of civil servants who were overburdened with other responsibilities; insufficient coordination between the state agency for land reforms and the agriculture and cooperative departments; lack of correct and updated land records; weak budgetary support; illiteracy and ignorance on the part of tenants; dual role of landlords as money lenders; heterogeneous interests of the village population; and the gulf in social status separating tenants from landlords, influenced the administrative and judicial authorities handling land disputes. The administrative, police and judicial structures of post-colonial India given their colonial origins function mainly on the basis of past precedents. Besides, law and order and rural development were both state subjects under the Constitution. The MHA was unable to emphasize the importance of ameliorative social action to state governments affected by Naxalite activities and to deal with the socio-economic issues highlighted by the movement separately from the issue of violence. However, the immediate issue became one of law and order and the socio-economic context was brushed under the carpet by states. In the early 1980’s, following a series of incidents of violence in the Jehanabad district of Bihar, involving the death of a large number of the rural poor, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who was sensitive to social change ordered the setting up of a Central Team to go to Bihar for a first hand study. The Team was led by Dr. Manmohan Singh, then Member-Secretary Planning Commission and included the author. On arrival in Bihar the Team found a district administration proud of its record of successfully maintaining public order though at the cost of a number of innocent lives. District officials took some time to realize that the purpose of the Team’s visit was not to appreciate the good work done on the law and order front but to evaluate the implementation of policies to enforce minimum wages, social dignity and rural development programmes. The state police reported the number of deaths in police action to be 12 persons, all of them naxalites. The in its report to the MHA had repeated the same figure. The figure was well below the number emerging from press reports. At a subsequent meeting in the MHA, the state chief secretary admitted that the number of those killed in police action was nearer 60 persons none of whom was a ‘Naxalite’.

In another major incident of Naxalite violence in the Dharmapuri district of Tamil Nadu in the early 1980’s, it was found that most of those killed in police encounters were innocent persons whose crime had been to demand minimum wages, social dignity and civil rights. The police officer in charge of the district when, confronted with this, maintained that ‘naxalites’ did not believe in the Constitution of India and therefore the state police were not bound by strictly constitutional methods in dealing with them.

Studies in two districts of Bihar and Tamil Nadu revealed a very different picture from that portrayed in intelligence reports sent to the ministry. The studies confirmed scholarly findings that social movements of the rural poor originated by articulating demands, which correspond to the most concretely, felt grievances and needs. When the elite/state machinery, instead of responding positively to the demands, tries to block the growing movement, it becomes more radical; and even revolutionary, with attempts at violent suppression. When the just and legitimate demands are violently suppressed, the State tends to lose its legitimacy.

The main demands of the rural poor related to the issues of land, wages and social oppression. A large number of them are landless agricultural workers. And a landless person in rural India is a non-person. Any attempt at getting possession of land, security of tenure, payment of minimum wages is seen as an attempt of disturb the social status quo and as soon as this happens public order and tranquility are threatened and all the relevant provisions of the IPC and the CrPC can be invoked by the rural elite and the state machinery to preserve the status quo. A significant line of enquiry from the administrative point of view would be to look at the systematic patterns of power and domination that arise in rural society and the injustice and exploitation that are associated with the unequal distribution of land and other productive assets. Further, the patterns of interaction between the administration at the local level and the rural power structure in the context of subsistence agriculture in most part of rural India also needed to be looked at.

Unfortunately, a power struggle that ensued over providing reliable information to the government witnessed the rapid decline of the R&P Division. The social science insights, essential for a proper understanding of the causes and nature agrarian tensions in the country during the 1980s were not forthcoming. The reports submitted by the IB were far from adequate. The crisis was aggravated by the non-institutionalization of adequate policy instruments to utilize academic studies in policy making.

III. NAXALITE/MAOIST MOVEMENT TODAY

Compared to the Naxalbari movement of the earlier phase, the (CPI Maoist)-led armed struggle is seen by observers to be at a more advanced level. It has spread over a larger area and has survived for over two decades. The strongest guerilla zone remains the Dandakaranya forest region in central India covering eleven districts across the four states of Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh. The Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) of Bihar and Jharkhand claims that its influence in the region extends to a population of about 12 million people of tribal origin. Even though more widespread than the earlier Naxalite movement, the Maoists of today have not yet been able to build powerful country wide political movements. The overall picture is one of a relatively strong militant outfit with popular support in its strongholds in the south, central and eastern regions. Outside its core areas, the Indian state has been able to prevent Maoist entry into the national political arena.

IV. TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY

During the 1980s, the MHA was not just a law and order ministry but was responsible for the important subject of the development of the Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs). Initiatives such as Special Component Plan for the former and the Tribal Sub- Plan for the latter were started and implemented on the ground through the state governments. The ministry also took a keen interest in the increasing violence against the SCs and STs in the country and initiated effective measures to stop the violence and to punish the offenders with ‘deterrent rapidity’. The Civil Rights Cell monitored the trends of violence and prepared reports for the Cabinet and Parliament. The MHA was a strong and powerful ministry with funds and police forces to compel the state governments to follow the central guidelines and instructions on issues of violence, development and social justice.

The creation in the subsequent period of the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment and the allocation of the subject of the development of Scheduled Castes and Tribes to that ministry along with the issue of socio-political violence against these communities reduced the MHA to a purely law and order apparatus. As a consequence, the annual report of the ministry for the year 2005-06 reads like a strange document devoted entirely to Naxalite violence with nothing to say on the increasing number and intensity of violence against the SCs and STs in the recent period. Such a juxtaposition of the naxalite violence with the increasing violence against the SC’s and ST’s is necessary for appreciation of both ‘violence of development’ and ‘development of violence’ and to devise appropriate measures in coordination with the state governments. In this sense, the creation of a separate Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment was not perhaps an altogether happy development for the Scheduled Castes and Tribes.

The process of commercialization of forest resources has reduced the access of indigenous communities to these resources. Alienation of tribal land to richer non-tribal elements from outside is a significant factor in tribal unrest. Displacement due to the construction of large dams and other industries has impoverishment of these communities, strengthening demands for tribal self governance.

Government programs for tribal development have had adverse consequences for tribal communities as documented in several studies including those conducted on behalf of the government of India (GOI, 2008). The extension of Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRI’s) to tribal areas can become an instrument of empowerment only after steps are taken to restore indigenous rights over land and forest. The setting up of the new states of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Uttaranchal to enable tribal participation in governance and decision making at decentralized levels, is largely ineffective due to the unchanged character and mindset of the administrative and police setup.

B. Mungekar, Member Planning Commission of India is reported to have prepared a report (Navlakha, 2006) showing that between 1951 and 1990, 40 million people were displaced as result of development projects. Of these 40 percent were tribal people. Only 25 percent of the displaced have so far been ‘rehabilitated’. The adequacy and quality of ‘rehabilitation’ has come into serious question especially in the context of the recent controversy over the Sardar Sarovar Project (Roy 2006). In the light of this, it is not surprising that the naxalite movement has found support among those sections of Scheduled Tribes who became victims rather than beneficiaries of development.

The issue was examined in depth by Dr. B. D. Sharma, then Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Tribes in his 28th Report to the President of India (Sharma, 2000). The report elaborated a Constitutional schema for establishing an egalitarian society with clear provisions for countering simultaneously the inequities of tradition and the ‘backlash of modernization’ in the nation’s development. The focus was on the dalits and the adivasis. The assessment was that the outcome of the developmental measures taken plus the adverse forces already at work was a negative one as indicated by the accentuation of deprivation and the ‘relentless slide back’ in the fortunes of these communities notwithstanding some token achievements such as ‘reservations’ in government jobs. The analysis laid bare the ‘omissions, distortions, subterfuges and the studied silence on vital issues’ in order to protect vested interests. The people were paying a heavy price for the so-called ‘development’. All the institutions of the state, executive, legislative and judicial, had abdicated their constitutional responsibility of safeguarding the interest of the deprived sections. The executive in particular, with its distorted role perception, is working against the interests of those whose wellbeing is its sacred trust. The action taken on the report by the government amounted to undermining constitutional values and trivialization of institutions by those who had the responsibility to protect them.

However, the model that was adopted in practice legitimized divestiture of the indigenous people’s traditionally recognized rights in the name of ‘development’. Not merely were the immemorial customary rights of the tribals ruthlessly violated but they were made to appear as trespassers in their own lands. All this was being done in spite of the concern expressed in the Constitution’s Fifth Schedule that the laws of the land should be suitably adapted in their application to Scheduled areas, a responsibility entrusted to the executive as part of its duty for the advancement of the Scheduled Tribes. To accomplish this task, the executive was conferred with special powers. The deliberate non-use of these powers resulted in not just unconstitutional and unjust governance but also in cruel and callous administration.

In the light of this analysis, the Report to the President also examined the issue of self governance at the village level and the disastrous effect of the non-recognition of command over community resources, which had resulted everywhere in disorganization, displacement and destitution of the adivasis. There could be no peace in the Scheduled Areas so long as the confrontation between the people and the state continued on the issue of self governance, particularly on the intimately associated question of the command over resources. A recent paper by Amit Bhaduri and Medha Patkar published in EPW (January 3 2009) meaningfully carries forward the discussion started by BD Sharma.

The current strategy of the MHA, as spelt out in its annual reports for 2004-5 and 2005-6, appear retrograde and counterproductive in the light of this analysis. The deployment of paramilitary forces on a large scale in the interior tribal areas of the country does not solve the problem but can cause immense misery to the common people. The whole policy of raising and deploying central paramilitary forces for local conflict management is based on faulty thinking and leads to serious internal security disasters. Paramilitary units as India Reserve battalions, which the Centre is encouraging states to raise to deal with internal security problems cannot be effective since their basic military type of training involves no local contact or interaction or understanding of the local population and problems. A recent visit to Chhattisgarh, where a Nagaland based IR battalion has been deployed, indicated emerging tensions between the district police leadership and the Naga battalion leadership since the latter is prioritized over the former, which is basically responsible for law and order management. A similar tension had emerged in Punjab earlier when the National Security Guard (NSG) was deployed over the head of the state DG of Police who was basically responsible for law and order in the state.

Similarly, it has been found in the northeast that lack of local knowledge on the part of the central paramilitary forces (CPFs) often led to disasters for the men, who were ambushed because they followed misleading intelligence provided to them by some interested local elements. Further, the induction of CPF’s often leads to tensions between them and the local police responsible for law and order and to demoralization of central of the central forces.

V. REFORMS IN THE MHA AND THE POLICE

The discussion above indicates the need for far-reaching reforms of the MHA and the rest of the central and state political systems in India as indicated by me in a separate study (Subramanian, 2007). Police reforms in India have been much under discussion recently with little or no action. The Soli Sorabjee report on the Model Police Act 2006 has been accompanied by the seven directions of the Supreme Court of India (CHRI, 2009) relating to i) the setting up of State Security Commissions; ii) tenure and selection of the state DGP; iii) tenure of other state police officials; iv) Police Complaints Authorities; v) Police Establishment Boards; vi) separation of investigation from law and order; vii) National Security Commission, Acceptance of the Sorabjee report and the implementation of the Supreme court directions have been met with dilatory responses. There has been no attempt by the central government to solicit the views of the civil society.

Police reforms would have to address the following key issues.

    • The paramilitary structures of even the civilian police which have led to most of its regressive political-organizational features (Arnold, 1986; Baxi, 1982 Subramanian, 2007);
    • While the Supreme Court in its seven directions has rightly focused on curbing ‘political interference’ in police work, it must be remembered that sometimes ‘political intercession’ with the police by a non-power holding politician on behalf of his constituents to set right a police wrong or to register a complaint may be ‘democratic’ in a society like ours with an authoritarian police structure and its oppressive behavior with the public. At other times, the management failures of the police leadership in giving relief to the people may lead to such ‘political intercession’ at the local level. ‘Politicization of the police is the price we have to pay for the democratic functioning of our polity’ (Verma, 2005). This type of political intervention is to be distinguished from the frequent and highly objectionable ‘political interference’ by the politician holding executive power who directs the police to do as he wills, against the Constitution and the law.
    • The role of police intelligence agencies at the centre and in the states, which are the main sources of information on social conflicts in the government; reports by policemen, who are not trained in social analysis, carry a pervasive bias against social movements which assert the legal, social and human rights of poor people and a bias in favor of ‘security of the state’. Policemen often consider such movements for social justice as ‘incipient insurgencies’. Other publicly available reports produced by scholars and activists bring out the real socioeconomic basis of such movements and contradict police reports. However, governments have a tendency to rely on police reports in such cases and go ahead to provide the police with increased fire power, mobility and manpower contrary to the need to undertake a political dialogue with the disaffected public; the notorious case of Binayak Sen is a good example of misuse of police intelligence against human rights activists; the situation points to the need for serious reform of the information systems in government;
    • The recasting of the Police Act 1861 must be accompanied by concomitant changes in the Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860, and the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861 which, given their colonial origins, prioritize state security issues such as ‘Offences Against the State’, ‘maintenance of public order and tranquility’, political intelligence collection, to the neglect of human security issues (Gupta, 1974);
    • The need for decentralization of the highly centralized police structure, which was suitable for the British Raj but is not relevant in a rapidly decentralizing governance system of a democratic country, involving the three tier system of Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs), operating from the district level to the village. The PRIs are constitutionally mandated to undertake crucial developmental functions but their work is hamstrung by the non-provision of adequate ‘functions, functionaries and finances’ (Bandyopadhyay, 2007) ; there is a need to decentralize the police structures in a way as to align them with the PRIs and make the police functionaries at the district level and below accountable to the heads of the PRIs; ‘democracy at the top and bureaucracy at the bottom’ as exists today must be abolished;
    • There is need to reconsider the role of about a million strong central paramilitary forces.
    • The need to review and revise from a human rights point of view, the Police Regulations, Police Manuals and Standing Orders in different states, which provide practical guidelines for day to day police activity at the state, district and police Station levels;
    • Police corruption is a serious but still understudied issue.
    • A recent study on police torture (People’s Watch, 2008) states that up to 1.8 million people in India are being tortured in police custody every year. Another study has delved into police ill-treatment of minorities, dalits, adivasis, and women (Subramanian, 2007). This needs to be tackled.
    • The culture of secrecy and non-transparency that pervades police organizations.
    • Discontinuance of repressive legislations, such as POTA, CLAA and AFPSA, in dealing with political movements, which are better dealt with by political means and political dialogues in a ‘deliberative democracy’ rather than by police repression (Planning commission, 2008; Kannabiran, 2008).

References

  • Arnold, D 1986 Police Power and colonial Rule Madras 1859-1947, OUP, New Delhi
  • Balagopal K 2006 Chhattisgarh: ‘Physiognomy of violence’, EPW XLI (22) 3159-92
  • Bandyopadhyay, D 2007 Land, Labour and Governance: An Anthology, Worldview, Kolkata
  • Banerji S, & T Gupta 2006 in Maoist Movement in India, Special Issue, EPW XLI (29): 3159-92
  • Baxi U 1982 The Crisis of the Indian Legal System, Vikas Publications, New Delhi
  • Bhaduri Amit and Medha Patkar 2009 Industrialization for the People, by the People and of the People, EPW, January 3
  • Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI), 2009 Seven Steps to Police Reforms (mimeo) New Delhi
  • Committee of Concerned Citizens (CCC) 2002 Third Report 1997 -2002 Hyderabad
  • Gupta, A 1974 Crime and Police in India (up to 1861), Sahitya Academy, Agra
  • Gupta, A 1979 The Police in British India 1861-1947, Concept Publishers, Delhi
  • Government of India GOI, Ministry of Home Affairs, 2006 Annual Report• __________________________ 2002 Annual Report
  • Kannabiran KG 2004 The Wages of Impunity: Power, Justice and Human Rights, Hyderabad, Orient Longman
  • Kannabiran, Kalpana 2008 ‘Challenging the Rule(s) of Law: Colonialism, criminology and Human Rights in India’, Sage Publications, New Delhi
  • Mullik, BN 1971-94 My Years with Nehru (in three volumes) Allied Publishers, New Delhi
  • Navlakha G 2006 Maoists in India, EPW XLI (22): 2186-89
  • Oommen TK Understanding Security: A New Perspective, Macmillan, New Delhi
  • People’s Union for Civil Liberties, 2006 When the State Makes War on its own People: A Report on the violation of People’s Rights during the Salwa Judum Campaign, Chhattisgarh, Raipur
  • People’s Watch, 2008 Torture and Impunity in India, National Project on Preventing Torture in India, Madurai
  • Parasuraman S and PV Unnikrishnan 2000 India Disaster Report New Delhi, OUP
  • Planning Commission, (GOI), 2008 Report of Experts Group, Developmental Challenges in Extremist Affected Areas, New Delhi
  • Roy, Arundhati 2006 ‘The cost of Living: The Narmada Dam and the Indian State’ in LI Rudolph and JK Jacobson Experiencing the State New Delhi OUP
  • Sharma, BD 2000, ‘Dalits Betrayed’ Sahyog Publications, New Delhi
  • ____________2001 ‘Tribal Affairs in India: The Crucial Transition, Sahyog Publications, New Delhi
  • Srinivasavaradan TCA 1992 Federal concept: The Indian Experience, New Delhi Allied Publishers
  • Subramanian KS 2007 Political Violence and the Police in India, Sage Publications, New Delhi
  • Verma A 2005 Indian Police: A Critical Evaluation, Regency Press, New Delhi *Mr K S Subramanian is IPS (Retd), formerly with the MHA and IB

July - September, 2009