REDUCING CORRUPTION IN POLITICS

* Sarvesh Sharma

Corruption, like water, travels from the highest point to the lowest level. Hence, to understand the gravity of the present situation in our country, the study of corruption must start from the top, viz. political corruption. The current article looks into need based and greed based political corruption. Future issues of this journal would cover corruption in other spheres of the State namely, the nonpolitical executive and the judiciary. Finally, we would consider an action plan for moving towards a corruption-free State that does not prey upon its citizens to enrich the individuals controlling its organs.

Corruption is commonly defined as misuse of public office for private gain. While private gain is typically interpreted in terms of monetary benefit, it can assume the form of non-monetary benefits such as improved chances of re-election and helping friends or members of one’s social or caste networks, political party or vote bank obtain public resources disproportionately or out of turn.

Corruption, in general, can be need based or it can be greed based. A person may indulge in corruption if there is no real honest option left to him to meet his essential / minimum needs. Or, he may indulge in corruption if he is unable to control his greed. It is equally true of institutions such as political parties.

1. Need based corruption

a) Financial Corruption

Meeting basic financial needs of any political organization through proper and open means became a near impossibility after corporate donations were banned in late 1960’s on the pretext that such donation come with undue influence on government policies. In the absence of alternative means of financing political activities, black money, and hence corruption, got embedded in the political fabric of our country. Earlier, an environment of acute shortages of basic necessities of life during World War II had already injected widespread corruption into the government set-up.

The need of political parties to raise finances for their legitimate political activities became acute even as political processes became murkier and more expensive. Around that time, a system of license permit raj was put in place to regulate economic activities in the country and to secure “commanding heights” of the economy for a public sector which, ironically, was owned by a single and not very public minded entity namely, the government. Equally ironically, the public were not allowed to own any shares in the public sector. It was not entirely a coincidence that the licence - permit raj so created also created an economy of all pervasive shortages. No wonder that the ruling party cashedin on these shortages to overcome the financial stringency that confronted it. The industrial and commercial sectors were co-opted into the system of corruption and patronage out of necessity to generate black money through confiscatory taxation policies meshing into the license - permit raj.

The economic reforms, hesitantly initiated in the early 80’s and accelerated during the unprecedented crisis of 1991, have largely freed the industrial and commercial sectors from the compulsion to operate within the framework of the old corrupt system. The phenomena of artificial shortages and black money operations are now in evidence mostly in areas where the old administrative controls have not yet yielded to economic and regulation based controls, e.g. energy (including the petroleum sector), land and agriculture sectors. Recent changes in taxation policies have also been

facilitating this change by raising the levels of tax compliance. Moreover, the ban on corporate donations to political parties has been removed and the corporate sector now finds it beneficial from the taxation point of view to make political donations by cheque.

However, corporate donations to political parties are far from adequate for meeting the current financial needs of political processes in our country. Hence, need based corruption for meeting the financial requirements of political parties not only continues, but has, in fact, grown substantially. Fractured mandates and coalition politics have become the norm at the centre and in many states. This has caused enhanced financial and non-financial demands on the political system. Consequently, there has been a large increase in both types of need based corruption.

The time has come now to give attention to the need based corruption of a financial nature, indulged in by individuals in politics and by political parties. In a historical sense, this is the system of financing the political processes. As stated above, the limited freedom allowed to corporates for making donations to political parties is not enough to meet their requirements. It is also not desirable that the corporate sector should meet a substantial portion of the financial needs of political parties. A system of public funding of the political processes essential to a democracy needs to be put in place. It has become imperative to start a wider debate on the subject and evolve a pragmatic framework for public funding of political processes – firstly, for meeting the expenses related to the day-to-day functioning of political parties and secondly, for meeting election expenses.

A possible framework for such an intervention could be by way of public funding of all recognized national and state political parties to the extent of their gross declared income, excluding government funding, in the previous financial year. This would not only improve the financial position of political parties but also encourage them to collect a larger part of their income by transparent means. It will not be appropriate to extend this support to all registered political parties, unless the criteria for initial registration, continuing registration and deregistration of political parties are very substantially tightened and codified. Another framework that has been suggested by Shri Yogendra Yadav involves the public funding of political parties on the basis of the number of votes obtained by them in the previous election. Both these methods have their merits and demerits. Other frameworks may also be proposed during a wider public debate.

In addition to reducing the role of black money, there are other collateral benefits in the public funding of political processes. These include weakening of the nexus between corrupt politicians and bureaucrats, better regulation, strengthening of party managements, weakening of fissiparous tendencies in political parties and reduction in the importance of black money and organized crime. It should also result in greater importance being given to grassroots workers and strengthen the hands of honest politicians and honest government officials.

The public funding of political parties, however, would, by itself, not meet the needs of the individuals fighting elections on the ticket of a political party that is receiving public funds. This is because there is no guarantee that the resources would be equitably allocated by the parties among their candidates. The system of public funding would, therefore, need to have built-in safeguards for equitable allocation of resources towards day to day party expenses and election expenses by political parties.

b) Non-Financial Corruption

Vote-bank politics is the most visible type of non-financial political corruption. Misallocation of public resources by choosing to target resources towards specific groups, such as one’s own caste group or towards one’s own electoral constituency, is a very widely practised form of non-financial political corruption. Organization of political competition along caste or community lines, particularly at the state level, has significantly increased political corruption, both financial and non-financial. Rabble rousers belonging to a dominant caste or community, with little education and even less inclination for public service, and very often with serious criminal record, are quite likely to succeed at the hustings. This tends to favour parties which are controlled by one or the other numerically dominant caste/community. Socially, educationally and economically backward areas are more prone to this variety of politics and political corruption. Uttar Pradesh and Bihar are leading examples of the ascendancy of caste and community based politics, as well as of increased political corruption. The political formations that benefit from this format of democracy have developed a strong vested interest in ensuring that the areas under their influence remain backward. This is true irrespective of the political philosophy of the ruling party. West Bengal, Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, U.P., M.P. and Rajasthan have all had governments of various hues, but all remain socially, educationally and economically backward because of non-financial corruption, though not necessarily of the caste variety.

Women, as compared to men, tend to give higher priority to expenditure on food, education, health, drinking water and sanitation. If these priorities are accepted and investment in them is increased substantially, it would weaken caste and community based politics and strengthen value and development based politics. It is hardly surprising that caste or community based political parties are the most vocal opponents of legislative initiatives for giving women a greater say in decision making and resource allocation.

Another form of non-financial corruption is vote buying. At its crudest, it may take the form of distributing cash or goods, e.g. liquor, clothes, on the eve of the election. Less crude methods include announcements of largesses by way of tax reliefs, price cuts, new projects or loan waivers just before the election code of conduct comes into force.

Non-financial political corruption is mostly aimed at winning an election to capture or retain power. More often than not, it involves spending resources rather than generating income. It is increasingly becoming clear that non-financial vote buying is on the wane for several reasons. Firstly, a more effective Election Commission of India has been able to restrict vote buying to a substantial degree through better monitoring and enforcement of the election code of conduct. Secondly, a better educated electorate has taken to voting in its best interest. The appeal of caste, community and religion still remains a potent factor, but its efficacy has also begun to decline as a greater proportion of the electorate becomes literate, and a free and assertive mass media, electronic as well as print, reaches out to the rural masses.

The best way to reduce non-financial political corruption is to accelerate universal education and improve access to independent sources of information through affordable mass media and personal communications.

2. Greed based Corruption

While need based corruption of political parties and political individuals is amenable to control through systemic actions, greed based corruption is more diffused and therefore more difficult to control.

A political individual may steal public resources in several ways. He may exploit his position to take bribes for placing a contract, or even for stopping the placement of a contract by resorting to red tape. He may set up schemes which are apparently aimed at public welfare, but in practice act as channels for leaking public resources. The public distribution system for food grains, sugar and kerosene is a prime example of a well intentioned scheme being converted into a lucrative channel of plundering public funds. Controls on land use and acquisition of land at low prices, ostensibly in public interest but in reality for private gain (as for SEZs and other designated industrial or commercial areas) are also major sources of corruption. Due to poor monitoring, wide-spread leakages are also being reported in a progressive scheme like NREGS, despite several built-in checks and self-correcting mechanisms. Public sector undertakings are, in most cases, being tapped to siphon public resources for personal use.

The opportunity cost of being in politics is likely to be lower for poorly qualified, incapable and dishonest politicians, since the market value of their services in alternative professions will be lower than that of highly educated, capable and honest politicians. Also, a greater propensity to misuse their office implies that dishonest politicians would reap higher financial returns from holding office. Naturally, in an environment where corrupt politicians are not punished but are protected by virtue of their office, a career in politics becomes the best refuge for scoundrels. Just as bad money drives out good money, bad politicians also drive out good politicians. A comparison of the quality of politicians today and the quality of politicians during the period immediately after Independence would tell its own story.

The Right To Information Act, 2005 has, for the first time, provided to the public an effective check on greed based corruption – both political and bureaucratic. Its results are beginning to be visible even in this short period and in spite of determined efforts by vested interests to nullify the provisions of the Act. If the corrupt practices brought to light with the help of RTI are condemned by the general public, and this is reflected in their voting decisions, then greed based political corruption would surely decline, as would bureaucratic corruption. It needs, however, to be recognised that the honesty of a candidate is only one of the many considerations in a voting decision and other considerations may override the consideration of the character and antecedents of a candidate.

Finally, an opaque system, in which the levers of controls are in the hands of a politically controlled and weak-willed bureaucracy, is a natural breeding ground for political (and bureaucratic) corruption. It is most clearly seen in the field of electricity distribution which is characterized by emasculated, patronage-based regulatory bodies. Transparent and independent regulatory bodies would go a long way in reducing the level of corruption in public life and benefiting the common man, or “Aam Aadmi”, by whom our politicians love to swear during their election campaigns.

*Mr. Sarvesh Sharma is Advisor to Common Cause

Boss: I can assure you that the value of the average employee will continue to increase.
Employee: That’s because there will be fewer of us doing more work, right?
Boss: Right. Except for the ‘us’ part.
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Jan - March 2009