The Gap Between Law & Practice Persists

Swapna Jha*

The Supreme Court’s decision in Prakash Singh & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (2006) laid down seven binding structural directives, but the true constitutional significance of the case lies in its follow-up phase and continuing legal force. Nearly two decades later, the implementation follow-up reveals partial compliance, legislative dilution, judicial monitoring, and persistent structural challenges.

On the directions of the Court regarding implementation of the recommendations of the National Police Commission (NPC), the Government had, on May 25, 1998, constituted a committee under the chairmanship of J.F. Ribeiro, IPS (Retd.). The Ribeiro Committee submitted two reports, which were filed in the Supreme Court (SC) in 1998 and 1999, respectively. It endorsed NPC’s recommendations with certain modifications. The case came up for hearing on February 10, 2005, and the Court directed the Union of India and respective State governments, including the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), to file their responses on the Committee’s recommendations.

In January 2000, the Government set up another committee under the chairmanship of K. Padmanabhaiah, former Union Home Secretary, to suggest structural changes in the police to meet the challenges in the new millennium. The Committee submitted its report on August 30, 2000. Out of 240 recommendations of the Committee, 23 recommendations were not accepted. As many as 154 recommendations pertaining to recruitment, training, reservation of posts, involvement of public in crime prevention, recruitment of police personnel, delegation of powers to lower ranks in police, revival of beat system, use of traditional village functional village functionaries, police patrolling on national and state highways, designs of the police stations, posting and transfer of SP and above, etc., were deemed to be implemented without any structural changes.

In November 2000, another committee was set up under the chairmanship of Dr. (Justice) V.S. Malimath, a former Chief Justice of the Karnataka and Kerala High Courts, to recommend measures for revamping the Criminal Justice System. The Malimath Committee submitted its report in April 2003. It gave 158 recommendations on strengthening of training infrastructure, forensic science laboratory and Finger Print Bureau, enactment of new Police Act, setting up of Central Law Enforcement agency to take care of federal crimes, separation of investigation wing from the law and order wing in the police stations, improvement in investigation by creating more posts, establishment of the State Security Commission, etc.

In September 2005, the Ministry of Home Affairs constituted an expert committee chaired by former Attorney General of India Soli Sorabjee, to draft a new Model Police Act to replace the outdated Police Act of 1861.

On October 30, 2006, the Committee submitted the draft Model Police Act recommending the following:

Post 2006, more than 20 States enacted new Police Acts claiming compliance with the Prakash Singh judgment. However, several of these statutes diluted the Supreme Court’s framework

• State Police Board: Formation of a board to guide policy, manage performance, and select the Director General of Police (DGP).
• Fixed Tenure: Guaranteed minimum tenure for the DGP and other key police functionaries.
• Separation of Functions: Separation of investigation from law and order maintenance.
• Police Accountability: Setting up independent mechanisms (State/District Complaints Authorities) to address police misconduct.
• Community Policing: Incorporating mechanisms for community participation and sensitivity toward weaker sections.

On October 31, 2006, the Centre forwarded the recommendations to the State governments, requesting them to enact new police legislation based on this draft.

On May 16, 2008, a committee under the chairmanship of Justice K.T. Thomas, former retired SC Judge, and two other members, was constituted to investigate the status of compliance by different States with the Court’s order. The Committee, in its report submitted to the Court in 2010, was “dismayed” by the indifference shown by various State governments on compliance with the Court’s directions. The report was forwarded to States/ Union Territories (UTs).

Another committee headed by Justice J.S. Verma was appointed after the Nirbhaya incident to suggest amendments in law to ensure the safety of women. The report clearly said that unless the police were reformed, women’s security would remain a pipedream. The report, 28 pages of which were solely devoted to police reforms, stated that systemic reforms in the police force would lead to improvement of the environment in general and women’s issues in particular.

Continuing Mandamus and Supervisory Jurisdiction

Instead of disposing off the matter in 2006 post the judgment, SC retained jurisdiction through continuing mandamus. States and UTs were required to submit compliance affidavits. The Court invoked Articles 32, 141 and 142 of the Constitution to ensure that its directions would operate as binding law until appropriate legislation consistent with constitutional principles was enacted.

Early Compliance, New Police Acts & Structural Resistance (2007–2012)

More than 20 States enacted new Police Acts claiming compliance with the Prakash Singh judgment. Most States issued executive notifications establishing State Security Commissions (SSC), Police Establishment Boards (PEB), and Police Complaints Authorities (PCA). However, several of these statutes diluted the SC’s framework. Empirical assessments by the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative revealed systemic dilution.

SSCs were deprived of binding powers, fixed tenure provisions were riddled with exceptions, PCAs lacked investigative independence, and the separation of investigation from law and order was implemented only partially. Moreover, many of these measures were largely formal. Independent members were often not appointed properly. SSCs’ recommendations were made advisory rather than binding. Fixed tenure provisions for DGPs and other officers were diluted by broad exceptions such as “administrative exigency”.

Supreme Court on Compliance

In its order dated September 23, 2013, SC expressed dissatisfaction with compliance levels. It clarified that States could not defeat the spirit of the 2006 judgment through cosmetic legislative changes. It reiterated that the directives were binding under Article 141 and that State legislation inconsistent with them would remain vulnerable to challenge.

In its 2018 order, SC reiterated that police reforms were integral to the protection of Article 21. It clarified the composition and functions of SSCs, PEBs, and PCAs. It rejected federalism-based arguments, holding that constitutional supremacy overrides administrative convenience. The Court again intervened to clarify the process of appointment of DGPs. It directed States to send proposals to the UPSC well in advance and reaffirmed the two-year minimum tenure rule, irrespective of superannuation date. It also emphasised the proper constitution and functioning of PCAs at the State and district levels.

The lackadaisical attitude of the States can be deduced from the fact that even after two decades of the judgment, the Court, on February 12, 2026, had to order the States to discontinue the practice of appointing acting DGPs, instead of regular appointments based on the panel of officers suggested by the UPSC. Several States, including Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Punjab, Telangana, Jharkhand, and West Bengal, came under scrutiny for this. SC, in its order earlier this month, came down heavily on the States that bypassed established norms and, instead, allowed officers to continue as acting chiefs for extended periods—in some cases, even for years. The Court also directed the UPSC to take proactive steps to prevent delays in determining panels of eligible officers for States to choose the DGP, following due process.

The States argued that police being a State subject under Entry 2 of List II of the Seventh Schedule, judicial directions interfered with legislative competence. SC rejected the argument, holding that enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 21 justified judicial intervention where prolonged executive inaction existed.

At the Union level, compliance has been relatively better. The NSC was constituted, and guidelines were framed for the appointments of chiefs of the central armed police forces. However, concerns persist regarding executive influence on appointments and premature transfers.

High Courts across India have relied on the Prakash Singh framework in cases involving arbitrary transfers and police accountability. The two-year tenure principle has been invoked in service jurisprudence, strengthening the continuing authority of the judgment.

Despite limited implementation, the judgment has transformed the discourse on police reforms. Police independence is now recognised as a constitutional requirement rather than a policy option. The directives serve as a benchmark against which legislative and administrative measures are evaluated.

Present Legal Status & Continuing Challenges

The seven directives continue to operate as binding law under Article 141. In States where compliant legislation is absent, the 2006 directives apply directly. Even where new Police Acts exist, provisions inconsistent with SC’s directions may be struck down if challenged. The judgment thus retains continuing legal force.

Despite incomplete implementation, the judgment has reshaped constitutional discourse. Police autonomy is now framed as a constitutional necessity rather than a policy preference. The case strengthened the doctrine of continuing mandamus and demonstrated the Court’s willingness to undertake structural governance reform when executive inertia threatens the rule of law.

Conclusion

While the Prakash Singh directives remain legally binding and constitutionally significant, they have not been able to overhaul the system as required. The gap between law and practice persists, as is evident from the way the States have partially implemented the Court’s directives. It is mostly done to get away from the wrath of the Court, but has not resulted in better “police” as was envisaged by the petitioners. The States have ensured that the reform happens only on paper. Legislative sincerity, administrative commitment and political will seems to be lacking, impeding the change that should have happened.

---

NEXT »

From Intent to Implementation