Who Controls the Constable?

Evaluating the Relevance of Prakash Singh v. Union of India

Divya Singh Chauhan*

It’s late in the evening, and a complainant comes to a police station to file charges for an assault. The station house officer listens, asks a few questions, and then hesitates. The complaint is serious, but registering a formal complaint may attract attention from local political actors. A phone call is made. The complainant is asked to return the next day. Per se, nothing illegal has occurred, yet the outcome is decisive. Access to the criminal justice system has been deferred, perhaps indefinitely. Such episodes occur as a matter of routine. They are exercises of discretion, repeated daily across thousands of police stations.

For most citizens, the police station is the first and most consequential point of contact with the state. Decisions taken here determine when complaints are recorded, how arrests are made, and where force is used. These decisions shape public trust, perceptions of fairness, and the lived meaning of constitutional rights. Although often described as a matter of administration, the scale and impact of police discretion render policing a constitutional question.

It was precisely this everyday, arbitrary exercise of power that brought the Supreme Court to intervene in Prakash Singh v. Union of India (2006)1 . The Court recognised that police dysfunction was not merely a matter of individual misconduct but of institutional design. To address this, it laid down a set of structural directives: the creation of State Security Commissions (SSCs) to insulate policing from informal political control; fixed minimum tenures for senior officers; a transparent procedure for appointing Directors General of Police (DGPs); Police Establishment Boards (PEBs) to regulate transfers and service matters; separation of investigation from law and order functions; and independent Police Complaints Authorities (PCAs) at the State and district levels2 . Together, these measures sought to reconcile democratic oversight with professional autonomy.

Two decades later, the conditions that prompted this judicial intervention persist and, in several respects, have deepened. To understand if and how Prakash Singh judgment continues to matter, it is necessary to examine how police power is organised, constrained, and directed on the ground.

Capacity Constraints

The authority exercised at the police station operates within a system marked by chronic shortages and overextension. Data from the Bureau of Police Research and Development show that state police forces have remained significantly understaffed for decades. As of January 2016, vacancies across state police forces stood at roughly 24%, amounting to more than five lakh unfilled posts. The actual police strength hovered around 137 personnel per lakh population, far below the United Nations’ recommended standard of 2223 .

Understaffing means that police personnel perform a wide range of functions beyond investigation and patrol. Court production duties, traffic management, election deployment, disaster response, and internal security assignments all draw from the same limited pool. Long working hours and personnel shortages, as documented by the Indian Police Journal, contribute directly to fatigue, low morale, and a greater likelihood of error or abuse4 . In this environment, the discretion to delay, deflect, or selectively prioritise complaints becomes structurally embedded.

Crime data provides further context. National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) statistics show that while crime rates per lakh population rose significantly after 2005, conviction rates remained modest. In 2015, convictions were secured in less than half of registered IPC cases5 . The Law Commission has repeatedly linked low conviction rates to poor investigation quality, inadequate training, and a lack of forensic support6 .

According to the 239th Law Commission report, “Police are either hesitant to proceed with the investigation against important/influential persons or they are under pressure not to act swiftly, especially if the person accused is in power or an active member of the ruling party. They adopt a pusillanimous attitude when the accused are such persons. Corruption at the police station level is affecting the timely and qualitative investigation. Further, the Police Stations are understaffed, and the police personnel lack motivation to act without fear or favour”.

Infrastructure deficits compound these problems, but they do not exist in isolation. Performance audits by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) have consistently recorded shortages in weaponry, vehicles, housing, and communication equipment across states. In Rajasthan and West Bengal, audits found shortages exceeding 70% in required modern weaponry, while vehicle shortages of around 30% were reported in several States7 . These gaps persist despite the existence of centrally sponsored modernisation schemes, with States utilising only a fraction of allocated funds8 .

However, the persistence of these deficiencies cannot be explained by resource scarcity alone. As the Supreme Court recognised in Prakash Singh judgment, the manner in which police leadership is appointed and retained has a direct bearing on planning horizons and institutional priorities9 . Where senior appointments are ad hoc and tenure uncertain, procurement and training decisions are easily deferred or reshaped by short-term political considerations. The Court’s insistence on stable leadership and insulated decision-making was intended to create continuity that would allow infrastructure planning to extend beyond electoral cycles.

Political Interference

This brings the analysis to the question of political control. Under the constitutional scheme, police forces remain subject to the superintendence of the political executive. Democratic accountability requires such oversight. The difficulty arises when this authority is exercised through informal and personalised channels rather than transparent institutions. The Second Administrative Reforms Commission observed that political superintendence frequently operates through unwritten instructions, pressure on transfers, and influence over promotions10.

At the ground level, political control reshapes discretion. Officers learn to anticipate preferences. The SSCs envisaged in Prakash Singh reforms were meant to mediate this relationship by articulating policing policy and evaluating performance in an institutional forum rather than through private direction11. Yet implementation has remained uneven, with several States either delaying their constitution or confining them to advisory roles12.

Recent incidents illustrate the consequences of this vacuum. The Sambhal violence case in Uttar Pradesh exposes the fragility of police accountability when it confronts administrative and political power.

Performance audits by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) have consistently recorded shortages in weaponry, vehicles, housing, and communication equipment across states.

A judicial order directing the registration of a criminal case against police personnel, including senior officers, was issued specifically to scrutinise police conduct during the violence. This was followed by open refusal by the local police leadership to comply with the order and, soon after, the transfer and demotion of the magistrate who passed it. Although formally described as an administrative decision, the timing of the move has raised concerns about the use of service controls to deter scrutiny of police actions13. The episode demonstrates how police accountability is often weakened through administrative pressures rather than legal challenges.

Leadership instability further deepens this dynamic. The directive in Prakash Singh reforms requiring the selection of DGP through a transparent process from a panel prepared by the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC), along with an assured minimum tenure, has been routinely diluted14. The continued appointment of acting police chiefs for extended periods remains common practice. The recent Supreme Court proceedings concerning the prolonged officiating tenure of Gaurav Yadav as DGP of Punjab have brought renewed attention to how easily these safeguards can be bypassed15. The Court’s criticism of the “acting DGP” culture and its decision to empower the UPSC to initiate contempt proceedings against non-compliant States highlight the fragility of tenure protections and the persistent gap between judicial directives and administrative practice.

Transfers operate as a parallel mechanism of control. Recognising their disciplinary power, the Court mandated minimum tenures for operational posts and the creation of PEBs to regulate service-related matters16. In practice, these boards often function under executive oversight, and transfer decisions continue to reflect informal considerations. The experience of IPS officer Sanjiv Bhatt is frequently cited in this context. After providing testimony relating to the 2002 Gujarat riots, he faced repeated transfers and was later prosecuted and convicted in a custodial death case from 1990. Recent reporting marking his continued incarceration has revived debate on how administrative processes can signal institutional disapproval17.

These organisational signals also shape investigative outcomes. In most States, investigation and law & order functions remain combined at the station level. When public order demands intensify, investigative work is postponed, and witnesses remain inadequately protected. IndiaSpend has documented that over 7 lakh police cases are closed every year due to a lack of evidence, reflecting a systemic investigative failure rather than the absence of crime18. These outcomes are often attributed to individual failure, but they are better understood as the product of sustained institutional strain.

The expansion of more militarised forces to address high-profile security threats, alongside a persistent shortage of civil police for everyday crime, has contributed to declining public trust and sustained criticism of policing outcomes, including custodial violence and abuse19. Citizens experience these failures directly, but the strain is equally visible within the police itself. Research published in the Indian Police Journal indicates that a significant proportion of traffic and operational personnel report high levels of occupational stress arising from role overload, long working hours, strenuous conditions, and political interference20. Other studies show that sustained organisational stress impairs decision-making, increases absenteeism, and leads to long-term physical and mental health consequences for police personnel, thereby weakening their capacity to protect the public effectively.

At the ground level, political control reshapes discretion. Officers learn to anticipate preferences. The SSCs envisaged in Prakash Singh reforms were meant to mediate this relationship by articulating policing policy and evaluating performance in an institutional forum rather than through private direction

In States where separation of functions has been attempted, including through pilot projects and specialised investigation units in States such as Kerala, official assessments have recorded improvements in case follow-up and victim engagement21. These limited experiments reinforce the Court’s reasoning that institutional reorganisation is necessary to improve outcomes.

Accountability Deficits

Public trust in policing ultimately depends on credible mechanisms for holding the police accountable. The establishment of PCAs at the State and district levels was intended to provide independent oversight for allegations of serious misconduct22. Yet most States have either failed to establish these PCAs or have failed to fulfil their mandate. According to a 2023 report by the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI), the implementation of PCAs as mandated by the Supreme Court in Prakash Singh v. Union of India remains limited and uneven.

Since the 2006 directive, 26 of the 28 States, excluding Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, and six of the eight Union Territories, excluding Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, have put in place a legal or policy framework for constituting State Police Complaints Authorities (SPCAs). However, of these, only 11 Authorities are operational on the ground, while three have been newly appointed and are yet to become fully functional. The remaining States and Union Territories have either failed to constitute SPCAs altogether, allowed them to become defunct due to delays in appointments, or have not made information about their functioning publicly available, including through responses under the Right to Information Act23.

Even where SPCAs exist, their effectiveness is constrained by the small proportion of complaints admitted for inquiry. In Gujarat, fewer than two percent of complaints -- just 68 out of 3,502 received between January 2018 and December 2022 -- were admitted for inquiry. Between January 2018 and March 2023, Maharashtra admitted less than a quarter of the 4,515 complaints it recorded, while Kerala accepted only 45 per cent of complaints for inquiry during the same period. Since complaints are admitted only when Authorities determine that they fall within their mandate, these figures highlight how narrowly drawn jurisdictions leave a substantial volume of grievances against police personnel unexamined, reinforcing the need to review and expand the mandate of SPCAs24.

The proportion of cases in which SPCAs have established misconduct and recommended action against police personnel remains even smaller. Despite receiving thousands of complaints, Delhi has recommended departmental action in only 17 cases to date. In Assam, the SPCA recommended action in 46 cases in 2018 and 15 cases in 2019, but this number fell to just 2 cases in 2021 and none in 2022.

The experience of Goa further illustrates these limitations. Over the past three years, the Goa SPCA has received an average of two complaints per month. Since April 2022, 74 complaints have been registered before the Authority, which takes cognisance only of allegations of serious misconduct such as death, grievous hurt, or rape in police custody. Of the 198 complaints filed before the SPCA, 102 have been disposed of, while 96 remain pending. Of these, only eight complaints have been closed with reports following completed hearings. Together, these patterns underscore how the failure to operationalise and empower PCAs has hollowed out a central pillar of the Prakash Singh reform framework25.

The continued failure of PCAs has coincided with the persistence of custodial violence, underscoring the gap between formal safeguards and lived reality. In September 2025, the Supreme Court initiated a suo motu public interest litigation after a Dainik Bhaskar report highlighted 11 custodial deaths within a span of eight months in Rajasthan, linking the incidents to the absence or non-functionality of CCTV cameras in police stations.

The continued failure of PCAs has coincided with the persistence of custodial violence, underscoring the gap between formal safeguards and lived reality.

To finally answer the question — how relevant is the judgment after 20 years? In short, Prakash Singh v. Union of India remains deeply relevant but also institutionally unfinished.

Similar concerns have been reflected in the interventions by the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC). In June 2025, the NHRC took suo motu cognisance of reports concerning the deaths of three prisoners in custody in Varanasi, Uttar Pradesh, and sought detailed reports from prison and police authorities, including post-mortem findings and magisterial enquiry reports26.

While such interventions remain crucial, they are dependent on external triggers, reinforcing the absence of routine, independent scrutiny within custodial institutions. The police’s recurring reliance on explanations such as missing or non-functional CCTV footage further highlights how enforcement failures persist even when judicial directions exist.

Cases such as the custodial deaths in Sathankulam, Tamil Nadu, which prompted national outrage and judicial intervention, reveal the limitations of addressing misconduct through individual prosecutions alone27. They draw attention to the absence of robust, institutional oversight capable of preventing abuse rather than responding after the fact. It is this structural gap that gives Prakash Singh v. Union of India its continuing relevance: the judgment articulated a framework of institutional accountability, leadership stability, and public oversight precisely to address routine exercises of custodial power that continue to shape citizens’ access to justice. However, the failure to implement these reforms has ensured that issues of control and accountability remain unresolved.

To finally answer the question — how relevant is the judgment after 20 years? In short, Prakash Singh v. Union of India remains deeply relevant but also institutionally unfinished.

The judgment correctly identified systemic police dysfunction and articulated a comprehensive architecture for police reform. The persistence of delayed FIRs, transfer-driven compliance, acting police chiefs, hollow PCAs, and recurring custodial violence only reinforces the accuracy of the Court’s diagnosis.

However, it underestimated the degree of political resistance to reform and the capacity of executive control to neutralise judicial directives through formal compliance and informal pressure. It also did not fully anticipate the expansion of coercive policing that has reshaped police power since 2006.

As a result, Prakash Singh today functions less as an enforceable reform programme and more as a constitutional benchmark, one against which the continuing failure to institutionalise police autonomy and accountability is measured.

References

NEXT »

States of Compliance

January-March, 2026