Improving Systemic RESPONSES

Improving Systemic RESPONSES

Recommendations from Victims and Experts

This article highlights key recommendations emerging from in-depth interviews with cybercrime victims and experts, as well as focus group discussions (FGDs). It presents edited excerpts from the recommendations detailed in Chapter 2 of Status of Policing in India Report 2026: Cybercrime—Victim Experiences and Systemic Responses.

Victims’ accounts highlighted the need for greater institutional responsiveness, accessibility and accountability in the aftermath of cybercrime. Experts, including police personnel, banking professionals and civil society representatives, emphasised reforms to strengthen cybercrime prevention and investigation, improve access to justice, and enhance coordination and accountability across institutions.

Improving Reporting and Access to Justice

  • Simplifying the cybercrime reporting portal: One victim of financial cyber fraud criticised the design of the National Cybercrime Reporting Portal (NCRP), observing that it should function more like other government digital services by guiding users through each stage of reporting, preventing incomplete submissions and allowing complaints to be saved and completed later.
  • Regular updates after the complaint: Victims also highlighted the lack of transparency once complaints had been registered. One victim suggested that complainants should receive immediate confirmation that “your details are now with such and such agency”, followed by regular updates on the case's status. Another recommended a tracking mechanism similar to the Right to Information process, enabling complainants to monitor each stage of the investigation rather than repeatedly contacting different agencies.
  • Editable complaints: Victims also proposed that online complaints should remain editable so that additional information or evidence can be submitted without requiring repeated visits to police stations.
  • Dedicated reporting mechanisms for online gender-based crimes: Experts working on gendered cybercrimes also highlighted the need to improve access to justice through dedicated reporting mechanisms, specialised support units and safeguards against coercive settlements for victims of gender-based cybercrimes.

Strengthening Institutional Response and Investigation

  • Defined timelines for registration and investigation: The timeliness of institutional responses emerged as one of the most consistent concerns. Victims pointed to the need for clearly defined timelines for complaint registration and investigation, routine review of pending cases and stronger accountability mechanisms to ensure that cybercrime complaints receive timely attention.
  • Single-window mechanism: The victims also pointed to the fragmented nature of the current institutional response. Several victims said they had to separately visit police stations, banks, payment service providers, telecommunication companies and regulatory authorities after an incident of cyber fraud. To address this, victims recommended establishing a single-window mechanism capable of coordinating action across relevant institutions. Such a mechanism would reduce procedural delays, improve inter-agency coordination and minimise the burden currently placed on victims in navigating multiple institutions.
  • Improving technical and legal police infrastructure: Across interviews, experts emphasised that the rapid growth and increasing sophistication of cybercrime have outpaced existing institutional capacity. Experts recommended expanding dedicated cybercrime police stations, strengthening cyber-forensic laboratories and investing in technological infrastructure to support digital investigations. Policing experts also highlighted the need to recruit investigators with engineering and cybersecurity expertise and recommended revisiting provisions of the Information Technology Act, 2000, that restrict the investigation of certain cyber offences to particular police ranks.
  • SOPs for inter-agency coordination in non-financial cybercrimes: Civil society representatives recommended developing standard operating procedures that clearly define institutional responsibilities and improve coordination between police, regulators and victim support organisations.
  • Helpline for non-financial cybercrimes: Experts also proposed establishing a dedicated 24-hour cybercrime helpline capable of providing immediate guidance, directing victims to the appropriate reporting mechanisms and ensuring that timely action is initiated during the critical period immediately following a cybercrime incident.

Accountability of Financial Institutions and Digital Platforms

  • More accountability of the banks: One victim suggested that banks should monitor unusual transaction patterns, with additional verification for high-value amounts. Victims recommended that account holders should receive immediate notifications whenever accounts are flagged for suspected fraud. Victims also proposed allowing customers to determine transaction limits when opening bank accounts and introducing additional safeguards for vulnerable users. One victim recommended that transactions above a specified amount from a minor's account should require parental approval before completion. Another recommended that authentication systems should be reviewed and updated regularly to respond to emerging threats.
  • Public disclosure of cyber-fraud statistics by the banks: A victim recommended that banks periodically publish fraud statistics so that customers can compare institutions based on their cybercrime records.
  • Redistributing responsibility across institutions: Experts also highlighted the need to redistribute responsibility for cybercrime prevention across institutions rather than placing the burden primarily on victims and law enforcement agencies. Banking experts, police personnel and civil society representatives argued that financial institutions, payment service providers and telecommunications companies should assume greater responsibility for preventing cyber-enabled fraud. The expert argued that such measures encourage financial institutions to invest in stronger fraud prevention systems because institutional failures carry tangible consequences.
  • Strengthening regulatory bodies: Experts recommended strengthening regulatory oversight of banks, payment intermediaries and telecommunications providers, particularly in relation to mule accounts, fraudulent SIM card issuance and other institutional vulnerabilities that facilitate cybercrime.

Strengthening Responses to Gender-based Cybercrimes

  • Gender-sensitive police response: Victims of gender-based cybercrimes, including NCII abuse, bullying and sextortion, highlighted the need for responses that recognise the distinct nature of these harms. They emphasised that dismissive attitudes and victim-blaming responses by authorities can further compound trauma. They, therefore, recommended that police personnel should ensure that complaints are handled with empathy, confidentiality and respect for victims' dignity. They also advocated for specialised gender sensitive training for police officers and judicial personnel.
  • Prompt action and improved inter-agency coordination: Victims also stressed that quicker intervention is critical in cases where harmful content, abusive messages and intimate images can spread rapidly across digital platforms. They recommended stronger coordination between police, social media platforms and other intermediaries to facilitate the immediate removal of such content and prevent further circulation.

Expanding Cyber Safety Awareness and Prevention

  • Awareness campaigns: Victims recommended practical awareness campaigns that explain common fraud techniques, safe digital banking practices, reporting procedures and the responsible use of digital payment applications, particularly for older adults, rural communities and first-time users. A banking expert stated that cyber safety campaigns should be delivered in regional and vernacular languages rather than relying primarily on Hindi and English.
  • Targeted training: This included strengthening cyber safety education in schools, supporting parents and communities, and encouraging greater responsibility among technology companies.

July September 2026